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RICHARD S. FRASE
LESSONS OF STATE GUIDELINE REFORMS
Richard S. Frase*
As the Sentencing Commission plans for the
future of guidelines in the federal courts, it should
consider the experience of the growing number of
states with guideline systems. Ten states already had
guidelines when the federal reform took effect in
November 1987; since then, seven more have imple-
mented guidelines, and another six have appointed
commissions to implement or study this approach.1
State guidelines have become increasingly
sophisticated, as later reformers built upon and
learned from the experiences of the states that went
before. A number of states have also looked to the
federal experience, usually in an attempt to avoid
problems which have made the federal version highly
controversial.2
State guidelines are very diverse in their origins,
purposes, and specific provisions, but they also have
many features in common. Some of the most impor-
tant features of state systems also serve to distinguish
them from the federal guidelines. First, state guide-
lines tend to permit more judicial discretion (espe-
cially in the assessment of offender characteristics),
and are less constrained by mandatory minimum
sentencing statutes. Second, all state guideline
systems (as well as the recently-revised ABA Sentenc-
ing Standards)3 reject routine sentence enhancements
based on unconvicted, "real offense" factors. Third,
state guideline reforms are increasingly motivated by
a desire to gain better control over escalating prison
populations; several states (and the ABA Standards)
directly link guideline sentences to available correc-
tional resources. Fourth, the focus on prison capacity
limits has encouraged state reformers to give increas-
ing emphasis to the development and structuring of
non-prison sanctions, especially for non-violent or
first offenders. Fifth, as a result of the above features
and other policy decisions, state guideline systems
have generally achieved broad acceptance by judges
and attorneys.
In the remainder of this essay, I would like to
focus on the third feature of state guidelines identi-
fied above - the concept of linking sentencing policy
with correctional resources. Minnesota pioneered this
approach in 1980, when its sentencing commission
adopted a goal of never exceeding 95% of state prison
capacity. The Minnesota Commission achieved this
goal throughout the 1980s - a period in which most
other states were experiencing rapid, uncontrolled
growth in prison populations, often resulting in
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serious overcrowding, court intervention, and the
need to grant early release to many inmates.4
The 1984 federal enabling statute directed the
Sentencing Commission to take existing correctional
resources into account, and mandated that guidelines
be formulated so as to "minimize the likelihood" of
federal prison overcrowding.5 However, the Commis-
sion did not take this directive seriously in formulat-
ing the initial guidelines. Detailed prison impact
assessments were not completed until after the new
guidelines had been submitted to Congress, 6 and
prison capacity management has never even been
mentioned by the Commission as a reform goal.
Indeed, instead of helping to reduce the serious
overcrowding which already existed in 1987,' the
guidelines made the problem worse - the Commis-
sion projected that its new guidelines would further
increase federal prison populations.8 As a combined
result of the Commission's guidelines, changing
federal caseloads, and increasingly severe sentencing
laws, the federal prison population has more than
doubled since 1987, and continues to greatly exceed
capacity.9 It is true that officially-reported measures
of federal prison overcrowding have declined since
1987,1 but this was achieved only through a massive
building program - expected to almost quadruple
capacity by the year 2000.11 Furthermore, some of the
"improvement" in overcrowding rates appears to
reflect changing definitions of "capacity." 2
Since the federal guidelines became effective,
more and more states have begun to view guidelines
as a means of gaining control over escalating prison
populations and correctional expenses. At present,
nineteen states have enacted statutes which require or
at least strongly encourage matching sentencing
policy to available resources. 3 Guidelines permit such
resource-matching because they make prison commit-
ment and prison duration decisions more uniform.
This greater uniformity allows policy makers to know
more precisely how much prison space will be
required to implement existing or proposed sentenc-
ing laws, and how soon that space will be needed.
Armed with this information, legislators can begin the
often lengthy process of expanding prison capacity
early enough to meet the expected need and avoid
overcrowding.
But legislators and sentencing commissioners can
also use population projections to make other choices:
they can reduce the predicted demand by moderating
penalty increases, by lowering existing penalties for
certain offenders, or by a combination of these
approaches. Accurate predictions of the full cost of
current and proposed sentencing laws thus play an
important role in formulating sentencing policy - by
forcing policy makers and the public to confront the
full costs of politically popular increases in sentencing
severity.
Especially in the angry, tough-on-crime climate
of recent years, capacity-based sentencing policy
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introduces a much-needed sense of fiscal responsibil-
ity, and emphasizes the inescapable need to set
priorities in allocating limited and expensive prison
resources. Proponents of particular "get tough"
measures can be told more precisely what these
measures will cost, and can then be asked to show
how these measures will be paid for-whether
through increased taxes, cuts in existing programs, or
reduced severity toward other offenders. Linking
sentencing policy to available resources also encour-
ages commissioners and legislators to take a compre-
hensive view of sentencing policy: Which offenders
require secure detention? For those who do not, what
non-custodial sanctions are available to hold offend-
ers accountable, deter crime, facilitate rehabilitation,
and promote victim and community restitution?
Linking sentencing policy to resources does not
necessarily mean "zero population growth" in state
prisons, but it encourages more controlled growth.
Minnesota's prison population has more than
doubled since 1980, but the increase was slow
enough, and was foreseen far enough in advance, to
permit timely expansion of prison capacity and
prevent serious overcrowding.
As efforts to balance the federal budget intensify,
Congress may be coming to realize the importance of
limiting prison population growth and linking
sentencing policy to correctional resources. The 1994
Crime Bill contains a provision requiring all legisla-
tion proposed by the Judicial or Executive branch that
would increase or decrease the number of federal
inmates to include a "prison impact" assessment,
showing the expected effect on prison and probation
populations and federal expenditures for the current
and next five succeeding fiscal years. 4
The Sentencing Commission and the Bureau of
Prisons already have the capability to provide
detailed prison impact assessments, using their
extensive sentencing and correctional databases.
Such assessments have been provided for at least
some crime bills and Commission proposals. 5 The
Commission should seek to further refine its predic-
tion model with input from the guideline states.
Many states have now developed sophisticated
computerized models, incorporating presumptive
sentences, current and expected caseloads, and other
variables which determine the size of inmate popula-
tions.
The Sentencing Commission should apply its
population-impact model to all major crime bills -
including those originating in the Legislative branch. 6
Impact assessments should also be made prior to
adoption of proposed guideline amendments (as was
mandated by the enabling statute).' 7 If the net effect
of any Commission proposal would be to further
increase federal prison overcrowding relative to
current and projected (i.e., already-funded) prison
capacity, the Commission should modify its proposal,
and/or suggest other guideline amendments to
eliminate the projected increase in overcrowding.
And if Congress does not appropriate the funds
needed to reduce and eventually eliminate over-
crowding, 8 the Commission should take the initiative
- by announcing the reductions in presumptive
sentences which it will make, to bring inmate
populations and capacity back into balance. Reduc-
tions in presumptive sentences should also be
recommended whenever needed to compensate for
increased overcrowding which is expected to result
from previously-adopted legislation, guidelines
provisions, and/or rising caseloads.
Resource-matching policies of the type described
above have enabled state guidelines systems to
prevent uncontrolled growth in prison populations
and expenses, avoid overcrowding, and, in several
states, reduce overcrowding which already existed
when the guidelines were adopted. 19 Resource-
matching has also served to promote more respon-
sible and rational sentencing policy, and has encour-
aged broader use of intermediate sanctions.20 As the
guidelines states have worked to slow or reverse the
growth in prison populations, they have discovered
that many offenders previously sent to prison did not
need to be there.
It is time for the Sentencing Commission to
follow suit. Many federal inmates do not need to be
in prison, and federal prison populations do not need
to continue their rapid growth. Moreover, the
Commission should no longer assume, as it has in the
past, that Congress will appropriate funds to pay for
any and all increases in sentencing severity. Until
now, Congress has essentially given the Commission
a blank check, but this "pay-whatever-it-costs" policy
may not continue in the current era of greatly
increased scrutiny of federal budgets and deficit-
spending.
Even if Congress continues to sign all of the
Commission's checks, the Commission has a respon-
sibility to provide its own independent, expert
assessment of whether such expenditures are
necessary and wise. The increased emphasis on non-
custodial sentencing alternatives in the guidelines
states reflects a growing confidence that such
intermediate sanctions can provide effective and less
costly punishment. The experience of the states also
suggests that custodial penalties are being signifi-
cantly overused in the federal system.
21
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